this point of view, must be prepared to protect themselves and the mandates given to them.
In addressing this issue, the former UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, proposed that the Security Council consider 'the utilization of peace-enforcement units' to strengthen the eff ective implementation of cease-fi re orders. 4 While the concept of 'peace enforcement' was innovative, the degree to which the use of armed force is required has posed a question as to how it is distinguished from enforcement measures under Article 42 of the Charter. In other words, to what extent are UN military personnel allowed to use armed force to secure an eff ective implementation of a peacekeeping measure? Attempts have been made to clarify the distinction on the conceptual level, but, as will be shown in the next section, discussions or policy formulations on such an abstract level do not contribute much to the clarifi cation. Th e question will therefore be addressed in the following sections by lowering the level of analysis to the strategic level in relation to the scope of the right of self-defence that has been recognised as one of the basic principles to be applied to UN peacekeeping operations. It will then be lowered further down to the tactical level in terms of the regulation of the use of an armed force in the fi eld. A study at these lower levels will reveal that what is envisaged by peace enforcement is nothing new and has been part of peacekeeping operations. Th e strategic and tactical points of view will provide a sound basis for ascertaining the limit to which a peacekeeping measure may allow for the use of armed force without change in the nature of the operation.
It should be noted, before proceeding with the examination, that this question might not be so serious in the case of consent-based peacekeeping operations. However, as shown in Chapter 4, the consent and cooperation of armed opposition groups in cases of internal armed confl ict are necessarily elusive and in no way form a legal basis for peacekeeping measures.
5 Th e question becomes serious when the Security Council decides on its own initiative to direct a peacekeeping measure without securing the consent of the parties to a confl ict in a strict legal sense, even though it may seek cooperation of the parties for the sake of an eff ective implementation of the measure. Th e question is, in addition, primarily concerned with the operation of UN forces deployed on a large-scale. 6 Although eff ective 
